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Descriptive psychopathology makes a distinction between veridical perception 
and illusory perception. In both cases a perception is tied to a sensory 
stimulus, but in illusions the perception is of a false object. This article re-
examines this distinction in light of new work in theoretical and computational 
neurobiology, which views all perception as a form of Bayesian statistical 
inference that combines sensory signals with prior expectations. Bayesian 
perceptual inference can solve the ‘inverse optics’ problem of veridical 
perception, and provides a biologically plausible account of a number of 
illusory phenomena, suggesting that veridical and illusory perceptions are 
generated by precisely the same inferential mechanisms.  
 
Introduction  
In this article we will revisit the classical distinction between illusory perception 
and veridical perception, in light of recent work in theoretical neurobiology. We 
outline theories in contemporary perceptual neuroscience that view perception 
as an inferential process. These theories have primarily been applied to low-
level illusory phenomena, but should also be of interest to clinicians and 
neuroscientists interested in psychopathological phenomena, as their 
application is readily extended to illusory phenomena that occur in the context 
of abnormal mental states. From this vantage point the classical qualitative 
distinction between true perceptions and illusions appears indefensible. 
 
Perception as Inference 
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It is now widely acknowledged in the neurosciences that perception is an 
inferential process1–3.  In the 18th century George Berkeley recognized that 
information collected by the sensory epithelia is mathematically insufficient to 
allow an unambiguous mapping back onto real-world sources4,5. The light 
hitting the retina, for example, forms a two-dimensional image, which has an 
infinite number of possible three-dimensional real-world sources. The image 
conflates information about object illumination, reflectance and 
transmittance4,6. The problem of inferring the ‘state of the word’ from sensory 
data alone is thus ill-posed7 (i.e. mathematically degenerate). 
 
Ill-posed problems can be made tractable by using contextual information to 
impose constraints on the interpretation of ambiguous data. Thus, although a 
certain sensory stimulus may support multiple conflicting interpretations if 
taken in isolation, one interpretation usually stands out as being ‘optimal’ once 
the context of the situation is taken into account. The computational details of 
precisely how this contextual information is acquired and used to guide 
perceptual inference remains the focus of lively debate in the field4,8–11. 
 
Perceptual Inference and Illusions 
In recent years perceptual neuroscience has focussed on sensory illusions in 
an attempt to elucidate the mechanisms underlying perceptual inference. 
Illusions represent situations where our perception reliably and indomitably 
disagrees with the true nature of the raw sensory information12. Even with the 
knowledge that, say, the two lines are of equal length in the Müller-Lyer 
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illusion (Fig 1A), or that flanking luminance values are equal in the Craik-
O’Brien-Cornsweet effect (Fig1B), it is exceedingly difficult for most people to 
perceive the images in this ‘veridical’ manner.  
 
Progress in the field of perceptual and computational neuroscience has 
shown that ‘illusory’ perceptual phenomena, far from representing failures in 
the perceptual apparatus, are explained by a theory of perceptual inference 
that uses contextual information and prior assumptions to constrain 
interpretations of sensory data12,13,6. Some of this work is briefly outlined here, 
with references to more comprehensive theoretical reviews.  
 
Wholly Empirical Vision 
In the ‘wholly empirical’ strategy, or Empirical Rank Theory (ERT), the 
subjective qualities of our perceptions are based on how the value of a given 
stimulus ranks against the cumulative distribution of previously experienced 
stimuli in the same context6,14. For example, it is well known that vertical lines 
of a given length appear longer than horizontal lines of the same length15 (Fig 
1C). ERT argues that this illusion arises because in the summed evidence 
from past experience of natural scenes horizontal lines are generally longer 
than vertical lines, so for two lines of a given length the horizontal line ranks 
lower with respect to all other perceived horizontal lines (and is thus perceived 
shorter) than the vertical line. Dale Purves and colleagues have used ERT to 
explain a number of visual illusions using both psychophysical paradigms16,17 
and computational modelling based on analysis of statistical regularities in 
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natural scenes18–20. ERT has also been used to reproduce 
electrophysiological properties of early visual neurons in artificial neurons21. 
These studies have been nicely reviewed elsehwere6,11,14.  Although it is 
natural for us to think of perception as making inferences about the ‘real 
world’, it is important to note that ERT makes no appeal to a world of ‘hidden 
causes’ that lies behind sensory data4, and is hence said to be ‘wholly 
empirical’14.    
 
Bayesian Perception  
Alternatively, it has been argued that the brain does maintain and update a 
representation of the world, which is used to guide perceptual inference about 
the ‘hidden causes’ underlying sensory information1,2,9.  This reasoning begins 
by acknowledging that perception is best explained by an inferential process 
that takes into account both current sensory data and prior knowledge (or 
expectation) about the state of the world, in a manner which follows the laws 
of Bayesian inference3,22. In other words, where the current sensory data and 
prior expectation (both represented as probability distributions over ‘real world 
causes’) are at odds, the Bayes-optimal perceptual inference is the precision-
weighted combination of the competing evidence (where precision is the 
inverse-variance of the said distributions, and is roughly equivalent to the 
confidence the observer has in the information9). Bayesian perceptual 
inference thus uses prior expectations to constrain the interpretation of 
incoming sensory data.  
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Intriguingly, non-invasive functional neuroimaging experiments in humans 
support the notion that feature-specific perceptual expectations (set up by 
prior experience) can modify cortical responses to incoming sensory signals 
at multiple nodes of the sensory processing hierarchy7,23–25. Despite its 
appeal, exact Bayesian inference is computationally expensive1, and a 
challenge has been to show how the brain may implement this strategy in a 
biologically plausible manner11.  
 
Hierarchical Predictive Coding  
One popular and neurobiologically plausible implementation of Bayesian 
perceptual inference, outlined by Karl Friston and colleagues, is hierarchical 
predictive coding1,9. Here perception, based on empirical Bayesian inference, 
occurs in a distributed fashion in reciprocally-linked hierarchical sensory 
processing circuits.  
 
At the heart of hierarchical predictive coding is the notion that brain maintains 
dynamic representations of the world, housed in the synaptic connections of 
hierarchical sensory processing circuits1. These representations become 
progressively more abstract at higher levels of the processing hierarchy, 
representing the ‘real world causes’ giving rise to sensory signals at the 
highest hierarchical levels2. Based on this internal world-model the brain is 
able to make on-line predictions about the state that the world is in, which are 
transformed into predicted incoming sensory signals by learned internal 
‘generative’ models. Predicted sensory signals cascade down the neuronal 
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hierarchy, acting as ‘prior’ sensory probabilities (or expectations) for lower 
regions, thus constraining the interpretation of incoming sensory signals.  
 
If there is a good match between the ‘top down’ prior probability and the 
‘bottom up’ sensory data, the current representation of the state of the world is 
reinforced. If there is a mismatch a ‘prediction error’ signal drives an updating 
of the brain’s current world model, which is subsequently re-tested against the 
real world data. The iterative process of matching ‘top-down’ predictions to 
‘bottom-up’ sensory signals arrives at a multimodal internal representation of 
the state of the world that is internally coherent and contains representations 
not only of basic sensory properties but also of abstract representations about 
the state of the world2. This final representation (formally, a ‘posterior 
probability’), arrived at through an inversion of the generative model9, is 
equivalent to a Bayes-optimal (perceptual) inference about the ‘real world’ 
source of the sensory data. Eloquent formal mathematical treatments of this 
proposal are outlined elsewhere1,7,9. 
 
Hierarchical predictive coding models of perception have been successfully 
used to explain visual13 and somatosensory26 illusions. Brown and Friston 
have recently applied the model to the Cornsweet illusion13 (Fig 1B), in 
contrast to the wholly-empirical treatment of the illusion16. Object luminance, 
registered by the retina, is created by the interaction between object 
illumination and reflectance. In the Cornsweet illusion the luminance of the 
peripheral regions on the left and the right are equal, but the perceived 
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brightness is not. Brown and Friston created a simulated Bayesian observer 
using a hierarchical implementation of empirical Bayes equipped with simple 
prior beliefs that relate to the ways illuminance and reflectance patterns 
dynamically change both spatially and temporally. Their simulated observer 
not only ‘perceived’ the illusory left-right brightness difference of the illusion, 
but also perceived Mach bands (illusory paracentral vertical bands). The 
simulated observer’s perception of the Cornsweet and Mach band illusions 
was sensitive to changes in contrast precision in a manner that was 
qualitatively similar to human subjects.  
  
Illusions and Psychopathology 
So far we have argued that low-level perceptual illusions can shed light on the 
computational principles underlying everyday perception. These illusions, 
paradigmatic of those investigated by perceptual neuroscience, involve 
perceptual experience that reliably and systematically disagrees with the ‘true’ 
nature of the physical stimulus, despite the fact that the observer is calm and 
attentive.  By contrast, the definition of the word ‘illusion’ in descriptive 
psychopathology, a cornerstone of clinical psychiatry27, is subtly different. 
 
Karl Jaspers, a founder of descriptive psychopathology, defined an illusion as 
a form of 'false perception', in which 'fresh, unreal objects' are perceived when 
external sensory stimuli are combined with 'transposing (or distorting) 
elements'.28 Two illustrative examples, taken from Jaspers’ canonical text, 
include ‘illusions due to affect’ (e.g. ‘A melancholic patient, beset by fears of 
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being killed [who] may take clothes hanging on the wall for a corpse’) and 
‘illusions due to inattentiveness’ (e.g. ‘We overlook misprints in a book and 
complete the meaning correctly according to context’)28. Here, the emphasis 
is on the false perception of meaningful ‘objects’ in the natural world (i.e. a 
corpse or a word), in contrast to the illusory stimuli of contemporary 
perceptual neuroscience, which are designed to elicit distorted perceptions of 
isolated basic features of the visual scene (e.g. luminance and length)12.  
 
The illusions described by descriptive psychopathology arise when an 
observer has a high prior expectation about the state of the world, and is 
confronted with noisy and ambiguous incoming sensory data. The observer’s 
prior expectation about the state of the world may be informed by the 
semantic context of a situation (in what have come to be termed ‘completion 
illusions’), the observer’s current emotional state29 (in ‘affect illusions’), or 
active imaginative processes acting upon inherently ambiguous sensory data 
(in ‘pareidolic illusions’)28,30–32. Sensory data may be ‘naturally ambiguous’ (for 
example patterns of shadow in cloud formations or a poorly lit visual scene), 
or may be ambiguous due to inadequate deployment of attention by the 
observer.  
 
Although this clinical subdivision of illusions28,30–32 may seem alien to some, 
we argue that psychopathological illusions that arise in the context of high 
sensory noise (often caused by low attention) and high prior expectation can 
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be easily accommodated by the hierarchical predictive coding model of 
perceptual inference. When the prior expectation about the state of the world 
disagrees with the incoming sensory data, the resulting posterior probability 
on the real world causes giving rise to sensory data lies between these 
hypotheses. In the case of psychopathological illusions, the prior expectation 
is held very confidently (formally, the prior distribution on causes has high 
precision), perhaps owing to a pathological mental state such as fear or 
paranoia, leading to a high subjective expectation of threatening objects. 
Conversely, the sensory data is noisy or poorly attended to (i.e. has low 
precision). Consequently the optimal perceptual inference about the real world 
causes underlying the sensory data (i.e. posterior probability) will lie closer to 
the prior expectation. If an observer subsequently allocates more attention 
towards the sensory information, the precision of incoming sensory data 
increases and the resulting posterior probability becomes more ‘veridical’. The 
Bayesian model, therefore, explicitly parameterizes expectation and attention 
in perceptual inference, and assigns them orthogonal roles1,2,10. The 
separable roles of expectation and attention in perceptual inference, along 




The account of Bayesian perceptual inference outlined above is thus capable 
of explaining a number of features of everyday perception, low-level 
perceptual illusions and the illusory phenomena outlined in descriptive 
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psychopathology. In all cases perceptual inference aims to arrive at the most 
likely representation of the world by taking into account prior expectations, 
incoming sensory signals, and the precision that both sources of information 
contain. Thus, it is not just illusory perception, but all perception that results 
from a combination of mental imagery with sensory stimuli33.  
 
Despite the promising application of ERT to low level perception and 
perceptual illusions, it does not easily lend itself to an understanding of object 
perception11, or how such perception is affected by states of low attention, 
heightened emotion or contextually-driven semantic expectations. As these 
features are necessary for psychopathological illusions to occur it is difficult to 
discuss these illusions within the context of wholly empirical strategies of 
perception. These illusions instead require an account of how the brain makes 
rich, context-dependent predictions about the state that the world is in, and 
tests these predictions against incoming sensory data.  
 
We have argued that the Bayesian account of perception is well placed to do 
this. Moreover, in this account the context and meaning of the perceptual 
scene is given primacy in the process of perceptual inference. Multimodal 
nodes high in the cortical hierarchy postulate internally-coherent hierarchical 
representations of the state of the world, already pregnant with behavioral 
relevance and meaning for the organism, which are ready to be confirmed or 
refuted by incoming packets of sensory data2. This generative account of 
perception is consistent with the intuitions of Phenomenological philosophers 
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like Merleau-Ponty, who argued that we do not construct meaning from 
meaningless sensory information, but that in perception ‘the whole is prior to 
the parts’.34  
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Figure 1. Simple visual illusions.  A: Müller-Lyer illusion. The vertical lines 
are of equal length, yet the left line appears longer. B: Craik–O'Brien–
Cornsweet illusion. The areas on the left and the right have the same 
luminance, yet the left shade appears brighter. C: Vertical and horizontal lines 
are the same length, but the vertical line appears longer.  
